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  1 
Most normative economic analysis assumes that individuals have coherent preferences over 
all relevant outcomes.  More specifically, preferences are assumed to be stable (that is, not 
liable to sharp changes over short periods of time, and not subject to significant degrees of 
random variation), context-independent (not affected by variations in the ‘framing’ of what, in 
terms of economic theory, is the same decision problem), and internally consistent (satisfying 
conventional properties of consistency, such as completeness and transitivity).  For many 
years, these assumptions were taken to be uncontroversial.  When acting as policy advisers, 
economists used methodologies that were based on these assumptions.  But recent 
developments in experimental economics, behavioural economics and stated-preference 
research has generated evidence which suggests that, in many of the contexts for which public 
policy decisions are required, individuals do not have coherent preferences.  These findings 
cause particular difficulties for those forms of cost-benefit analysis, widely used in 
environmental policy appraisal, which rely on stated-preference methods.  The aim of this 
paper is to consider how economics can make a useful contribution to normative policy 
analysis if and when the assumption of preference coherence fails to hold. 
  In Section 1, I introduce the problem of preference incoherence in general terms.  
Traditionally, normative economics has used a criterion of preference-satisfaction.  In the 
rhetoric of the discipline, this criterion has been defended as an application of the principle of 
consumer sovereignty, and in contrast to paternalism.  But preference-satisfaction, as 
traditionally understood, cannot be used as a decision criterion when preferences are 
incoherent.  Some influential behavioural economists are now arguing that, in the light of the 
evidence of preference incoherence, economics needs to reconsider its traditional aversion to 
paternalism.  In Section 2, I review this argument for ‘libertarian paternalism’.  In Section 3, I 
present an opposing argument, based on a re-interpretation of the principle of consumer 
sovereignty.  I propose an understanding of consumer sovereignty in which value is attached 
to the satisfaction of individuals’ demands, as and when they are expressed, and irrespective 
of whether they reveal coherent preferences.  Drawing on analysis from an earlier paper, I 
show that, under ideal conditions, competitive markets in private goods are effective in 
satisfying such demands.  In Section 4, I propose an approach which treats cost-benefit 
analysis as an attempt to simulate these properties of ideal markets in situations of market 
failure.  The central idea is that the valuations that should be used in cost-benefit analysis are 
those that individuals would reveal ‘at the moment of consumption’.  This provides a general 
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market goods.  In Section 5, I argue that this principle favours valuations derived from 
hedonic prices rather than valuations elicited by stated preference methods.  I suggest that 
because hedonic-price valuations are elicited at the moment of consumption, they may be less 
susceptible to anomalies.  In the final section, I draw some general conclusions. 
  
1.  The problem of preference incoherence   
Why is the assumption of preference coherence so important for normative economics?   The 
most fundamental answer is that it plays a crucial role in the philosophical justification of the 
methods of normative economics.  The standard justification works by treating a person’s 
preferences as indicators of her ‘welfare’ or ‘well-being’.  This idea supports a presumption – 
a presumption that has been upheld by many generations of welfare economists – in favour of 
consumer sovereignty and against paternalism.  If we were forced to conclude that people’s 
preferences are typically unstable, context-dependent or internally inconsistent, it would be 
difficult to maintain the claim that preferences provide a measurement of well-being.  That 
might seem to call into question the whole strategy of basing normative analysis on 
individuals’ preferences. 
  The coherence assumption has an additional role when the principles of normative 
economics are put into practice in cost-benefit analysis (CBA).  In a conventional CBA, the 
aim is to assess the impact of some public policy option on individuals, measured in terms of 
preference-satisfaction.  This requires the analyst to elicit individuals’ preferences over the 
outcomes of the policy and of a benchmark ‘do-nothing’ option.  Notice that neither of these 
sets of outcomes has yet been realised (the policy decision must precede its effects), that at 
least one of the two will not be realised at all (the policy cannot be both implemented and not 
implemented), and that individuals cannot make private choices between the two sets of 
outcomes (the policy cannot be implemented for one person and not for another).  So we 
cannot discover a person’s preferences over these specific outcomes by reading them off from 
a choice problem in which they are revealed directly.  Elicitation has to be indirect: we collect 
evidence from contexts other than the policy decision itself and then infer the preferences we 
need.  Such inferences are possible only within a model of preferences.  The model provides a 
common framework within which we can represent both the effects of the policy decision and 
the environment in which preferences are elicited.  It imposes a structure on the data we 
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almost all CBA, preference coherence is a fundamental part of the modelling strategy by 
which preferences are elicited and policy-relevant inferences are made.  If the coherence 
assumption is not consistent with the data we collect, we are in trouble.  
  Where such inconsistencies occur, stated-preference methods of elicitation make them 
highly visible.  Stated-preference surveys, like laboratory experiments, elicit individual 
responses under highly controlled conditions.  This makes it very easy to compare two or 
more responses made by the same individual, at almost the same time, to questions which 
differ only in specific respects.  If the same question elicits two different responses from the 
same person over a very short time interval, there is an obvious violation of the stability 
assumption.  If two questions with the same logical content but different framings elicit 
different responses, and if this ‘framing effect’ has a consistent pattern, there is an obvious 
violation of the context-independence assumption.  And if two questions are related in such a 
way that a certain combination of responses is inconsistent with some standard consistency 
axiom, but responses show a systematic pattern that is contrary to that axiom, there is an 
obvious violation of the assumption of internal consistency. 
  The controlled nature of stated-preference elicitation is, I think, one reason why 
stated-preference research was one of the first areas of applied economics to confront the 
problem of ‘anomalies’ (that is, systematic deviations between actual decision-making 
behaviour and the implications of standard assumptions about preferences).  Because 
environmental policy is one of the areas in which CBA is most reliant on stated-preference 
methods, environmental evaluation became one of the first battlegrounds of the 
methodological war between rational-choice and behavioural economics.  However, it would 
be wrong to think of anomalies merely as artefacts of stated-preference methods.  It is now 
becoming clear that the psychological mechanisms that induce anomalies in stated-preference 
studies and in laboratory experiments have significant impacts in many other areas of 
economics, including finance and industrial organisation.
1 
  I do not want to get diverted into a discussion of the evidence about the significance 
and robustness of anomalies.
2  I shall just record three familiar examples of anomalies that 
cause severe problems for stated-preference studies.  These are: the disparity between 
willingness-to-accept (WTA) and willingness-to-pay (WTP) valuations; the apparently 
insufficient sensitivity of stated valuations to the scale or scope of the good being valued; and 
the tendency for stated valuations to be influenced by apparently irrelevant ‘cues’, such as the 
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want to cite their favourite pieces of evidence in support of a claim that some alleged anomaly 
can be eliminated by the use of the right elicitation method.  Of course, there are important 
issues to be resolved about the robustness of anomalies.  (I am one of the many economists 
who are currently trying to resolve these issues.)  But that is not the point of the present paper. 
  This paper asks how normative analysis should be carried out in the event that 
individuals do not have coherent preferences.  There is surely enough evidence of anomalies 
to make it prudent to start thinking about this question now.  One can always hope that this 
precautionary work will turn out to be unnecessary. 
 
2.  Libertarian paternalism 
In the last few years, behavioural economists have begun to consider the normative 
implications of their empirical findings.  Among the establishment of American behavioural 
economists, a consensus seems to be emerging around the position of libertarian paternalism.  
The essential idea is that, if individuals’ preferences are incoherent, the justification for using 
preference-satisfaction as the criterion for public decision-making lapses; it becomes 
legitimate for ‘social planners’ to use their own judgements about individuals’ best interests 
in place of inferences about what those individuals prefer.  The fact that this position is so 
widely supported suggests that it coheres with ideas about normative analysis that are deeply 
rooted in economics.  Thus, it is useful to begin by considering the arguments for and against 
libertarian paternalism.  The arguments against provide the starting point for an account of my 
rival proposal.   
  The ideas I now discuss have been presented in slightly different forms by two sets of 
co-authors.  Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler (2003a, 2003b) use ‘libertarian paternalism’ as 
the label for their favoured approach.  A very similar approach has been proposed 
independently by Colin Camerer, Samuel Issacharoff, George Loewenstein, Ted O’Donaghue 
and Matthew Rabin (2003), under the banner ‘regulation for conservatives’.  Each set of co-
authors includes one American legal scholar (Sunstein and Issacharoff); the other five authors 
are leading American behavioural economists.  These labels declare the authors’ intentions to 
propose a justification for paternalistic regulation of economic behaviour which (it is claimed) 
is compatible with ‘libertarian’ or ‘conservative’ principles.
3  The two sets of co-authors 
appeal to essentially the same evidence from behavioural economics to support the claim that 
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of approved policy interventions.  They justify these interventions on essentially the same 
grounds, namely that individuals are being steered away from erroneous or irrational 
decisions.  They propose that policy analysis should use a form of CBA which does not  
presuppose that valuations of costs and benefits are always to be based on individual 
preferences (but, as I shall show later, provide almost no guidance as to how such a CBA 
might work). 
  Both of these proposals appeal to the idea that, if an individual’s preferences are 
incoherent, her choices can be influenced by regulations which, although paternalistic in 
intent, do not contravene the principles to which anti-paternalists are committed.  The key 
thought here is that anti-paternalists believe that public policy decisions should respect, or be 
responsive to, individuals’ preferences.  But if an individual lacks coherent preferences, there 
is nothing to respect, nothing to be responsive to.  This creates a vacuum within which 
paternalistic policies do not offend against anti-paternalist principles. 
  Sunstein and Thaler make this point particularly strongly, arguing that the findings of 
behavioural economics show that paternalism is ‘inevitable’, that the idea that there are 
‘viable alternatives to paternalism’ is a ‘misconception’, and that the anti-paternalist position 
is ‘incoherent’, a ‘nonstarter’ (2003b, pp. 1164-65, 1182).  In its essentials, their argument 
runs like this.  Traditionally, economics has assumed that individuals have coherent 
preferences which are prior to the decision situations in which they are revealed.  If this 
assumption were true, it would make sense to ask whether those preferences should be 
respected; the anti-paternalist would say that they should, while the paternalist would be 
willing to countenance policies which overruled them.  But we have learned from behavioural 
economics that, in many cases, individuals do not come to decision problems with pre-
existing preferences.  Instead, preferences are formed only when individuals confront 
particular problems, and those preferences are sensitive to apparently arbitrary details of 
framing, such as which option is presented as the default.  Thus, whoever is responsible for 
designing the presentation of options to individuals is able to affect the preferences that those 
individuals will reveal; there is no way of standing back and simply ‘respecting’ preferences.  
This provides a space in which ‘planners’ can steer individuals’ choices (p. 1162).  (A 
planner, in Sunstein and Thaler’s terminology, is ‘anyone who must design plans for others, 
from human resource directors to bureaucrats to kings’ [p. 1190]).  Once the planner 
recognises this fact, she cannot avoid a decision about the direction in which to steer the 
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judgement about the individual’s best interests.  It is in this sense that there are no viable 
alternatives to paternalism. 
  Both proposals include restrictions on the scope of legitimate paternalism which are 
intended to make them acceptable to libertarians or conservatives.  Sunstein and Thaler’s 
official position is that public policies should be chosen to maximise welfare, subject to the 
constraint that individual freedom of choice is maintained: 
The libertarian aspect of our strategies lies in the straightforward insistence that, in 
general, people should be free to opt out of specified arrangements if they choose to 
do so.  Hence we do not aim to defend any approach that blocks individual choices. 
(2003b, p. 1161) 
The idea seems to be that, in choosing how to present options to an individual, the planner 
should choose a frame which steers choices in the welfare-maximising direction, but ‘bad’ 
options should not be removed from opportunity set.  But Sunstein and Thaler do not always 
respect this self-imposed constraint.  In a section entitled ‘How much choice should be 
offered?’, they provide the following answer to their rhetorical question: 
Libertarian paternalists want to promote freedom of choice, but they need not seek to 
provide bad options, and among the set of reasonable ones, they need not argue that 
more is necessarily better.  Indeed that argument is quite implausible in many 
contexts.  In the context of savings plans, would hundreds of thousands of options be 
helpful?  Millions?  … [O]ne recent study finds that when 401(k) plans [i.e. US 
retirement savings plans] offer more choice, participants are slower to join, perhaps 
because they are overwhelmed by the number of choices and procrastinate.  (2003b, 
pp. 1196-1197) 
They go on to discuss how a libertarian paternalist might ‘decide how much (reasonable) 
choice to offer’.  The implication is that Sunstein and Thaler are in favour of blocking 
individual choices in cases in which they judge this to be in the individual’s interests. 
Camerer et al propose a different constraint on the scope of paternalism.  We are told 
that all the authors share ‘trepidations’ about supporting paternalistic regulations.  However, it 
turns out that these concerns are not about the principle of imposing restrictions on individual 
choice, but only about the risk of miscalculation.  The concerns are that ‘paternalistic policies 
may impose undue burdens on those people who are behaving rationally’ and that, because 
behavioural economics is at an early stage of development, mistakes may be made; thus, 
‘caution’ is appropriate ‘at this stage’ (p. 1214).  This caution is expressed in Camerer et al’s 
proposed criterion of asymmetric paternalism.  This is defined in relation to a model in which 
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Paternalistic policies confer benefits (denoted B) on boundedly rational consumers by 
‘counteract[ing] mistakes’, but may impose costs (C) on fully rational consumers by 
restricting their opportunities to make optimal decisions.  Camerer et al define a policy to be 
asymmetrically paternalistic ‘if it creates large benefits for those people who are boundedly 
rational (B is large) while imposing little or no harm on those who are fully rational (C is 
small)’ (p. 1219). In other words, paternalistic interventions are favoured only when the 
expected benefit/cost ratio is high.  However, there is little here to reassure anti-paternalists.  
If benefits and costs are measured by reference to the planner’s conception of welfare, 
paternalistic proposals are likely to show high benefit/cost ratios.  The whole point of 
paternalistic restrictions is to steer people towards actions which (it is claimed) they would 
have chosen anyway, had they been fully rational.  Thus, no costs are imposed on people 
whom the planner deems to be fully rational.  Conversely, anyone who claims to be harmed 
by a paternalistic policy is revealing the bounds on his rationality.    
  Both sets of co-authors propose that paternalistic policy options should be appraised 
by CBA.  In Camerer et al’s account, paternalism is justified as a means of correcting ‘errors’ 
in decision-making (p. 1218).  To say that a class of decisions are in error is to say that they 
‘do not accurately reflect the benefits [the decision-makers] derive’ from them.   It is a 
‘crucial assumption’ that the bounds on rationality which generate such errors ‘are empirical 
questions subject to systematic analysis, and thus cost-benefit calculations can be made’ (pp. 
1221-1222).  The implication is that Camerer et al favour a form of CBA in which benefits 
are not measured in terms of revealed preferences; but they do not say how, even in principle, 
benefits are to be measured. 
  At the level of philosophical principle, Sunstein and Thaler are a little more 
forthcoming.  With respect to any given individual, the objective of policy is to promote that 
person’s ‘best interests’.  Individuals are treated as not acting in their own best interests if 
their decisions are ones ‘they would change if they had complete information, unlimited 
cognitive abilities, and no lack of willpower’ (2003b, p. 1162); in such cases, the planner 
should try to steer them towards the choices they would have made under those conditions.  In 
the language of moral philosophy, this is a criterion of informed desire.  When applying such 
criteria, however, it is notoriously difficult to distinguish between, on the one hand, 
supposedly empirical claims about what a particular person would choose under specified 
counterfactual conditions and, on the other, normative claims about what every person ought 
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life are supported by rational arguments, and hence that any truly rational person would share 
those beliefs.  We might hope that Sunstein and Thaler would limit the discretion of their 
planner by prescribing some methodology for identifying informed desires.    
  Sunstein and Thaler’s recommendation is that, where possible, planners should use ‘a 
form of cost-benefit analysis’.  But they provide no guidance about the methodology to be 
used.  They say that their proposed analysis would differ from conventional CBA in not 
always using WTP measures.  This is as one would expect: the whole argument is premised 
on the supposition that individuals do not have well-defined preferences.  But all they say 
about the methods that should be used are the following two anodyne statements: ‘[The CBA 
should be] one in which a serious attempt is made to measure the costs and benefits of 
outcomes’ (p. 1166) and ‘The goal of a cost-benefit study would be to measure the full 
ramifications of any design choice’ (p. 1190).  I conjecture that, at least at the time they wrote 
this, Sunstein and Thaler had been unable to define a CBA methodology that they felt able to 
defend. 
  To sum up, the logic of the libertarian paternalist position allows CBA to be 
decoupled from the criterion of preference-satisfaction whenever individuals lack coherent 
preferences.  In these situations, it licenses public decision-makers or their policy advisers to 
use their own judgements about individuals’ best interests rather than trying to infer, from 
choices or survey responses, what those individuals in fact want.  But no methodology for 
arriving at or justifying such judgements has yet been proposed.  
  Traditionally, CBA has been seen as a way of making public decision-making 
responsive to individuals’ preferences in much the same way that competitive markets are (or 
have been thought to be).  Many economists –  I for one – have valued CBA as a barrier 
against paternalistic motivations in policy-making.  The libertarian paternalist approach runs 
the risk of throwing away these features of CBA.  Of course, if Sunstein and Thaler are right, 
we have no choice in the matter: there are no viable alternatives to paternalism.  But are they 
right?  Or can there be a non-paternalistic form of CBA which does not require us to assume 
that preferences are coherent? 
 
3.  How the market deals with incoherent preferences 
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example which Sunstein and Thaler use to illustrate libertarian paternalism.  This is a story 
about the cafeteria at some unspecified ‘organisation’.  Customers proceed along a line, 
choosing food items from a display, until they reach the checkout.  The cafeteria director 
notices that given items are more likely to be chosen if they are placed earlier in the line.  On 
the basis of current medical knowledge, she judges that it would be in the best interests of 
most customers to eat fewer sweet desserts and more fruit.  Which should she display first, the 
fruits or the desserts?   Sunstein and Thaler claim than an anti-paternalist would advocate the 
rule that ‘give[s] customers what [the director] thinks they would choose on their own’.  But 
this rule is meaningful only if ‘what the customer would choose’ can be defined 
independently of the director’s choice and, by hypothesis, this is not the case: consumers’ 
preferences are context-dependent (they depend on how the items are displayed).  Hence, we 
are told, the only reasonable rule is that the director should do what she judges to be best for 
consumer well-being – that is, put the fruits first.  This story is intended to illustrate the claim 
that there are no viable alternatives to paternalism and that anti-paternalism is incoherent 
(2003b, p. 1164).  
  One of the most surprising features of Sunstein and Thaler’s treatment of this example 
is that they never consider the possibility that the cafeteria director might choose the display 
which maximises profit.  Although they do not specify whether their cafeteria is operated for 
profit, they are using the example to illustrate a general argument in favour of paternalistic 
regulation of markets; so it is surely natural to ask how the director’s problem would be 
solved in a market.  Sunstein and Thaler recognise that the director will be constrained by 
‘market pressures’, but then offer the following reasons for not pursuing the implications of 
this idea: 
But some of the time, market success will come not from tracking people’s ex ante 
preferences, but from providing goods and services that turn out, in practice, to 
promote their welfare, all things considered.  Consumers might be surprised by what 
they end up liking; indeed, their preferences might change as a result of consumption.  
And in some cases, the discipline imposed by market pressures will nonetheless allow 
the director a great deal of room to maneuver, because people’s preferences are not 
well-formed across the relevant domains.  (p. 1165) 
  The first argument here, that firms can be successful without tracking ex ante 
preferences, fails to recognise a significant property of markets.  It is true that successful 
firms do not simply find out what consumers currently think they want, and then supply that; 
  10they anticipate what consumers will come to want, starting up the process of satisfying 
demands before consumers experience them.  Market rewards come from supplying what, in 
the event, consumers are willing to pay for.  But a profit-seeking firm has no need to make its 
own judgement about what is good for the consumer.  As the business maxim puts it: the 
customer is always right.  I take this maxim to mean that the customer is right at the moment 
at which she buys; a firm succeeds by predicting what she will want to buy when that moment 
arrives. 
  I cannot understand the second argument, that market pressures are less when 
consumers’ preferences are ill-formed.  The pressure of the market is not to satisfy well-
formed preferences but to make profit.  A firm’s room to manoeuvre is the degree to which it 
can pursue non-profit-maximising strategies without being taken over or going bankrupt.  The 
extent of this freedom depends (negatively) on the competitiveness of the markets in which 
the firm operates, not on whether its customers’ preferences are coherent or incoherent. 
  Without adding more detail to Sunstein and Thaler’s story, it not possible to say 
whether a profit-maximising cafeteria would display the desserts before the fruit or vice versa.  
But the problem of determining which display would lead to greater profit is well-defined, 
even if customers’ preferences are affected by the display.  The tendency for customers to 
favour the earlier items in the line is just one of the many regularities in their behaviour that 
needs to be taken into account in solving the problem.  We might expect a competent and 
experienced retailer, working under the pressures of the market, to be able to find the profit-
maximising display.  Let us suppose that this display puts the desserts first.  If Sunstein and 
Thaler’s claims about the inevitability of paternalism are correct, this market solution must be 
deemed to be not viable, a non-starter.  But on what grounds? 
  Since what is at issue are the general principles by which paternalism might be 
defended or criticised, we need to consider those properties of market solutions in general 
that are exemplified by the profit-seeking director’s decision to display the desserts first.  We 
immediately run up against the problem that standard economic analyses of the workings of 
markets assume that individuals have coherent preferences.  The centrepieces of conventional 
welfare economics are the two ‘fundamental theorems’ which establish connections between 
competitive equilibrium and Pareto efficiency.  Traditionally, anti-paternalist economists have 
appealed to these theorems as showing that competitive markets are efficient in satisfying 
individuals’ preferences, while regulations which restrict consumers’ choices introduce 
inefficiencies into the system.  But the Pareto-efficiency criterion presupposes coherent 
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the fundamental theorems to justify the allocation of resources through markets.  This thought 
may lie behind Sunstein and Thaler’s rejection of the idea of a market solution to the cafeteria 
problem. 
  Before dismissing the market solution as a non-starter, however, we should ask 
whether there are other ways of characterising the outcomes of market processes which do not 
assume preference coherence but which might still provide a basis for a normative defence of 
the market.  I have explored one such line of enquiry in a recent paper (Sugden, 2004).  The 
analysis centres on an idea with a long history in economics: that the market respects 
consumer sovereignty.  Although theoretical economists have often treated this claim as 
merely a rhetorically-charged reference to the fundamental theorems, the idea of being 
sovereign seems to imply much more than that one’s preferences will be respected insofar as 
they are coherent.  If you are the sovereign in the traditional monarchical sense, the supreme 
source of authority is your will.  If your will is arbitrary, capricious or unstable, that may be 
unfortunate for your subjects, and perhaps even for you; but its authority is not thereby 
invalidated.  Analogously, one might think, an economic system which respects consumer 
sovereignty should be understood as one which responds to consumers’ demands without 
asking whether those demands issue from coherent preferences. 
  In my 2004 paper, I analyse a model of an exchange economy in which preferences 
need not be coherent.  In this model, there are two types of agent – consumers and traders.  
Each consumer is endowed with some bundle of private goods, one of which goods plays the 
role of money.  Trading takes place over an interval of time, the ‘trading period’.  At the start 
of the period, traders make public offers to buy and sell non-money goods at prices (expressed 
in units of money) specified by themselves, subject to specified constraints on total quantities 
traded.  These offers are fixed for the duration of the trading period.  Over the period, 
consumers have the continuous opportunity to take up any available offers, subject to their 
budget constraints.  The only assumption about the rationality of consumers is that, at any 
given moment, each individual is price-sensitive.  That is, if a given good is offered for sale at 
two different prices, the consumer does not buy at the higher price; similarly, if there are 
offers to buy at two different prices, he does not sell at the lower price.  From one moment to 
another, no consistency of any kind is assumed.  A consumer may even choose to buy a good 
at a high price at the same time as selling it at a low price.  Traders are assumed to be highly 
rational in the pursuit of profit, which can be achieved by arbitrage – that is, by buying cheap 
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only at the end of the period.  This allows traders to conduct arbitrage across time, but within 
the trading period.  There are many traders in competition with one another.  An equilibrium 
state of the model is defined as a configuration of offers by traders such that each trader’s 
array of offers is profit-maximising for her, given the other traders’ offers and given the 
behaviour of consumers. 
  I show that, in equilibrium, each good has a single price at which each consumer is 
always free to buy and sell as much as she chooses, subject only to his budget constraint; all 
markets clear (that is, traders do not end up with positive or negative holdings of any good); 
and each trader makes zero profit.  In these respects, an equilibrium state of the model looks 
like a Walrasian competitive equilibrium, in which the traders collectively have performed the 
role of the Walrasian auctioneer.  But we cannot say that this market is efficient at satisfying 
consumers’ preferences, since coherent preferences may not exist. 
  What we can say, however, is that the following opportunity criterion is satisfied.  Let 
x = (x1, .., xn) denote an allocation, that is, an n-tuple of consumption bundles, one bundle for 
each of the n consumers.  Let x* be the allocation that is in fact realised through trade.  This 
allocation satisfies the opportunity criterion if, for every other feasible allocation x′, we can 
find some consumer i such that xi′ ≠ xi* and such that i had the opportunity to reach xi′ by 
accepting some combination of the offers made to him by traders (but in fact chose to do 
something else).  In other words, any proposal to substitute some feasible x′ for the actual 
allocation x* involves overruling the actual choice of some consumer i, giving him something 
he chose not to have in place of what he chose to have.  We might say that the proposal 
requires i’s opportunities to be constrained.  If the opportunity criterion is satisfied, every 
proposal for feasible change requires at least one consumer’s opportunities to be constrained 
in this way.  In this sense, the opportunity criterion is a test of efficiency in the provision of 
opportunity.  In my 2004 paper, I show that this criterion is satisfied in the equilibrium state 
of the model.  I shall call this result the opportunity theorem. 
  Here is another way of understanding the opportunity criterion.  Suppose that, under 
some resource-allocation regime, the actual outcome is x*.  Consider any other feasible 
outcome x′.  Let I be the set of consumers i for whom xi′ ≠ xi*.  Thus, a movement from x* to 
x′ involves some set of exchanges of private consumption goods among the members of I, 
with no change to the bundles held by other consumers.  We can ask:  Why is the outcome is 
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Because at least one member of I chose not to undertake his part of the set of exchanges that 
would have been required for a move from x* to x′.  In other words, the members of I cannot 
collectively object that they have been denied the opportunity to make this move by mutual 
consent.  The essential idea behind the opportunity theorem is that, in equilibrium, no 
opportunities for mutually agreed exchanges remain unrealised. 
  This idea allows the following intuitive explanation of the opportunity theorem.  
Because of the assumption of price sensitivity, it is possible to define a measure of the surplus 
created for a consumer in any given transaction carried out between him and a trader.  For 
example, suppose that, at some moment, a consumer buys one (indivisible) unit of a particular 
good at a market price p
M.  It follows from the assumption of price sensitivity that there must 
be some reservation price p ≥ p
M such that the consumer would have bought the good if the 
price had been p or less, but would not have bought if the price had been greater than p.  Then 
the consumer’s surplus on the transaction is p – p
M.  Now consider a pair of transactions by 
which, through the intermediation of a trader, one consumer sells one unit of a good at one 
moment and another consumer buys it (possibly at a different moment).  Suppose consumer i 
sells at a price of q
M, having been willing to sell at any price greater than or equal to q, and 
consumer j buys at p
M, having been willing to buy at any price less than or equal to p; 
obviously q ≤ q
M and p ≥ p
M.  Then the transaction creates a surplus of q
M – q for i, a surplus 
of p – p
M for j, and a surplus or profit of  p
M – q
M for the trader.  Summing these three 
components, the total surplus created is p – q.  Notice that this value is independent of the 
actual prices p
M and q
M; it is a property of consumers’ attitudes to a net trade between 
themsleves, considered without reference to the intermediation of the trader.  Clearly, if p > q, 
there are values of p
M and q
M at which the trader’s profit is positive.  Thus, whenever a 
putative exchange between consumers would generate positive surplus, there is an incentive 
for traders to intermediate it.  In equilibrium, however, traders’ profits are zero, having been 
driven down by competition.  The foregoing argument can be extended to any set of putative 
exchanges among any set of consumers.  For any such set of exchanges, a measure of total 
surplus can be defined.  If this measure is positive, there is an opportunity for traders to make 
profits by intermediation; but competition forces profits to zero.  Thus, all opportunities for 
mutually agreed exchanges between consumers are realised. 
  This property of my model is the analogue of the first fundamental theorem of welfare 
economics – that in competitive equilibrium, no opportunities for Pareto improvements 
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theorem is expressed in terms of individuals’ assumedly coherent preferences, while the 
opportunity theorem is expressed in terms only of price-sensitive behaviour. 
  This difference can be illustrated by considering a case in which individuals’ 
preferences are systematically context-dependent.  Daniel Kahneman proposes the 
psychological hypothesis that many individuals are subject to a focusing illusion: in tackling 
judgement and decision tasks, they give disproportionate weight to those features that are 
brought to their attention by the nature or framing of the task.
4  I conjecture that this effect is 
one of the causes of a form of context-dependence that I have noticed in my own preferences, 
and which I suspect is quite common.  Immediately after I have visited a tourist site, I find 
that I have a desire to own goods whose value depends on my interest in, or emotional 
attachment to, features of that site.  Thus, having visited an art gallery, I feel a desire for cards 
and posters of the art works I have seen; having visited a nature reserve, I feel a desire for 
books which provide information about the plants that grow there.  Before the visit, I had no 
such desires.  A few hours after the visit, my desire to own these goods has evaporated.  If my 
conjecture is right, the stimuli of the visit have induced a transient increase in the subjective 
significance I attach to objects that are associated with thoughts about the site.  In this respect, 
my preferences are (depending on how we choose to describe the focusing illusion) unstable 
or context-dependent.  Nevertheless, for a short period, there is an opportunity for surplus-
creating trade between me and the suppliers of the goods I temporarily desire.  In my 
experience, the incentives of the market ensure that these opportunities are in fact realised: 
there are market agents who anticipate the transient desires of tourists like me by setting up 
gift shops in just the places we are most likely to be at the time we feel the desires.  The point 
of this example is that the market does not respond to my preferences only insofar as they are 
coherent; it responds to my desires as and when I experience them, and insofar as they are 
then backed up by willingness to pay. 
  I now return to the case of Sunstein and Thaler’s cafeteria.  The customers’ 
preferences between dishes are context-dependent.  In my version of the story, the director 
puts the desserts before the fruits because this display maximises profit; customers who might 
otherwise have bought fruit buy desserts.  Is this an example of consumer sovereignty at 
work?  I submit that it is.  The director is seeking to create and appropriate surplus in 
essentially the same way as are the traders of my abstract model, or the gift-shop owners in 
the example of the tourist site.  Presumably, the director’s reason for putting the dessert first is 
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the line’, to an extent that outweighs their lower willingness to pay for ‘fruit late’ rather than 
‘fruit early’.  Collectively, then, consumers are willing to pay to have the dessert displayed 
first, and the market responds by providing this display. 
  It might be objected that the cafeteria customers do not consciously desire this display; 
in responding to their differential willingness to pay for different displays, the director is 
merely taking advantage of them.  But it is often the case in markets that consumers are not 
conscious of subtle features of their own desires, while entrepreneurs recognise willingness to 
pay and respond to it.  Think of how consumers can be willing to pay a premium for products 
which are attractively styled, even if they cannot articulate what makes one product more 
attractive to them than another.  The tendency of the market is to provide people with the 
things that they are willing to pay for.  That is consumer sovereignty. 
  Sunstein and Thaler might accept this conclusion but ask:  What is so good about 
consumer sovereignty?  In their example, consumer sovereignty fails to promote the best 
interests of consumers, as judged by the planner.  If we presuppose that normative judgments 
are made from the viewpoint of a planner, and that planners should be concerned with 
individuals’ best interests, the case against consumer sovereignty has been made.  But should 
those principles be presupposed? 
  The idea that normative judgements about social arrangements should be made from 
the viewpoint of a ‘planner’, ‘public official’ or ‘social observer’ is deeply embedded in 
economics; it reflects the discipline’s roots in nineteenth-century utilitarianism.  But there is 
another possible perspective, that of conctractarianism.
5  In the contractarian perspective, 
there are as many viewpoints as there are members of society.  Each person makes his or her 
own judgements about what is good for her.  The role of normative assessment is not to arrive 
at a unified conception of what is good for society, but to find fair terms on which these 
separate individuals can reach agreement about how their society should be arranged.  When 
normative analysis is understood in this way, paternalism in its purest sense is simply off-
limits: no one has the standing to overrule individuals’ judgements about their own interests.  
It remains possible that an individual might appoint an agent to act on his behalf, steering his 
choices according to principles that the individual himself endorses.  Conceivably, the 
members of society might collectively license some public agency to impose ‘paternalistic’ 
regulations on their own choices.  But if regulation of this kind is to have a contractarian 
justification, each individual must judge the regulation to be in his own interests.  In the case 
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customers to be steered away from the desserts; the customers must believe this themselves 
(or, at least, be willing to delegate such dietary judgements to the director).  Thus, justified 
paternalism is not made inevitable by the mere fact that individuals’ preferences are context-
dependent. 
  Still, we need to consider whether an individual who recognises that his preferences 
are context-dependent will see consumer sovereignty, rather than regulation by a planner, as 
in his best interests.  I cannot prove that this is necessarily the case.  An individual may be 
aware of properties of his psychology which, in particular circumstances, lead him to act 
contrary to what he would normally judge to be his interests; and he may be so concerned 
about this that he chooses to be regulated.  (In terms of Sunstein and Thaler’s example: a 
person who wants to eat a healthy diet but knows that his resolution is liable to be undermined 
by the sight of sugary food might choose a regulatory regime which reduces the visibility of 
desserts and increases that of fruits.)   I make the more modest claim that it is possible – that it 
makes sense – to see consumer sovereignty as in one’s interests, even in situations in which 
one lacks coherent preferences. 
  As I have explained, a regime of consumer sovereignty tends to provide each of us, at 
each moment, with those things that we then want and are willing and able to pay for.  The 
question is whether each of us, reflecting about what matters to us, can conceive of this as in 
his or her interests.  Intuitively, an affirmative answer is surely natural: what could be more 
obvious than that a person has an interest in being able to get what he wants, when he wants 
it?  This idea, I suggest, captures an important part of the visceral appeal of consumer 
sovereignty as a rhetorical device. 
  Thinking more philosophically, we can distinguish between a person as a continuing 
entity through time, and a succession of that person’s selves; at each moment in time, a 
particular self is in control of the person’s actions.  We might say that a regime of consumer 
sovereignty tends to provide each self with what it wants and is willing and able to pay for.  Is 
this in the interests of the continuing person?  Thinking reflectively about myself as a 
continuing person, I can say that consumer sovereignty is in my interests if I can identify with 
each of the selves which, at their respective moments, are doing the wanting and the paying.  
That is, I need to treat the transient wants of each of my possible future selves as my wants – 
even if those selves have conflicting wants.  In other papers, I have tried to show that this way 
of thinking about one’s identity is philosophically coherent (Sugden, 2004, 2006, 2007).    
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4.  Cost-benefit analysis as market simulation 
I have argued that competitive markets are effective in meeting individuals’ demands for 
private goods, and that this claim need not presuppose the existence of coherent preferences.  
But this argument does not extend to public goods.  In the context of the opportunity theorem, 
the problem is that a mutually beneficial multilateral contract for the supply of a public good 
cannot be decomposed into a set of independent bilateral contracts between individual 
consumers and traders.  For this reason, we cannot rely on competition between profit-seeking 
arbitrageurs to satisfy demands for public goods. 
  In conventional welfare economics, public goods are recognised as giving rise to 
market failure.  Individuals are assumed to have coherent preferences over bundles of private-
good and public-good consumption, and so the concept of Pareto-efficiency in the provision 
of public goods is well-defined.  Efficiency can be achieved if decisions about the provision 
of public goods are made according to the Kaldor-Hicks compensation test (or ‘potential 
Pareto improvement criterion’).  Since markets cannot be relied on to meet this criterion in 
relation to public goods, there is a role for CBA.  But what if the assumption of preference 
coherence does not hold? 
  As I explained in Section 2, libertarian paternalists have argued for a form of CBA in 
which the measurement of costs and benefits can be decoupled from individuals’ preferences, 
as revealed in actual choices.  Very little has been said about how such a CBA might be 
carried out, but the implication seems to be that, where preferences are incoherent, planners’ 
judgements about individuals’ best interests can be substituted.  For anyone who is attracted 
by the idea of consumer sovereignty, this approach will be unattractive.  But is there a feasible 
alternative?  Is there a form of CBA that is compatible with the principle of consumer 
sovereignty and that does not require preferences to be coherent? 
  In trying to develop such a form of CBA, my starting point is the familiar idea that the 
purpose of CBA is to simulate the workings of competitive markets in situations of market 
failure.   A typical statement of this idea can be found in the Green Book produced by HM 
Treasury, the definitive source of guidance on methods of appraisal for projects funded by 
central government in the UK.  The section entitled ‘Valuing non-market impacts’ states:  
Where market values are not available for an identified cost or benefit, there are a 
number of approaches to attributing a value for inclusion in an appraisal ....  The 
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to pay’ (WTP) or ‘willingness to accept’ (WTA) [for] a project’s outputs or 
outcomes.
5 
Implicit in the concept of market simulation is the idea that, under suitably idealised 
conditions, the outcomes produced by markets satisfy some normative criterion.  Market 
simulation then uses that same criterion to make policy recommendations in situations in 
which the idealised conditions do not hold.  In such situations, the normative criterion is 
applied by asking a counterfactual question of the form:  Had there been an ideal market, what 
outcomes would have come about? 
  In the passage from the Green Book, the idea is that, in general, ‘market values’ 
should be used to measure costs and benefits.  In this context, the normatively relevant feature 
of market values is that they reveal individuals’ WTP or WTA, at the margin, for the relevant 
goods.  When goods are not traded on markets, it may still be possible to estimate individuals’ 
WTP or WTA.  By using these estimates in place of the missing values, we simulate the 
market.  More generally, it can be shown that, under conditions of perfect competition and 
with the assumption of preference coherence, a project gives a positive profit to the firm 
which undertakes it, if and only it the project satisfies the Kaldor-Hicks compensation test.
7  
The compensation test is the conventional criterion in CBA.  Thus, it can be argued, the use of 
conventional CBA to determine decisions about the provision of public goods simulates 
market decision-making about private goods. 
  One way of defending the market-simulation approach is to identify the criterion that 
market allocations satisfy, and then to endorse that criterion directly as a normative principle.  
Thus, for example, one might appeal to arguments from welfare economics in favour of the 
compensation test as a measure of economic efficiency, and argue that economic efficiency is 
an appropriate objective for at least certain activities of government.  An alternative, indirect 
defence starts from the observation that, in political debate in most developed countries, there 
is a general presumption in favour of the market as the mechanism for determining the 
allocation of resources with respect to private goods.  If this presumption is accepted, 
consistency requires that the normative criterion used in decision-making about public goods 
should be satisfied by market allocations in normal cases involving private goods.       
  The problem we now have to face is that the traditional argument for CBA as market-
simulation depends on the assumption of preference coherence.  If that assumption does not 
hold, we need to re-specify the normative criterion that is satisfied by market allocations 
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The preceding sections of this paper have responded to the first part of the problem by 
defining a condition that ideal market allocations satisfy: the condition that all opportunities 
for mutually agreed composite transactions between consumers are realised.  The second part 
of the problem is to find a form of CBA which allows that condition to be satisfied in the 
provision of public goods. 
  In thinking about this problem, it is useful to begin by examining the properties of an  
‘opportunity for a mutually agreed composite transaction’ in the context of markets for 
private goods.  Such an opportunity is a feasible combination of transactions which generates 
positive surplus.  The total surplus generated in any combination of putative transactions is 
measured in terms of the WTP of buyers at the moments at which they buy (that is, for each 
buyer, the highest price at which he would buy) and the WTA of sellers at the moments at 
which they sell (that is, for each seller, the lowest price at which she would sell).  Given the 
assumption of price sensitivity, these WTP and WTA values are well-defined, whether or not 
individuals’ preferences are coherent.  Thus, surplus is well-defined too.  So what I have 
called an ‘opportunity for a mutually agreed composite transaction’ can usefully be called a 
surplus-creating opportunity. 
  It is important to recognise that the total surplus generated by a composite transaction 
is a sum of surpluses generated in distinct transactions, carried out by different people and 
perhaps at different times.  Each individual may be aware only of the transaction to which he 
is a party, and only at the moment at which he makes it.  The surplus that accrues to an 
individual depends on his WTP or WTA for that specific transaction at that particular 
moment.  If the composite transaction is extended over time, some individuals may have 
completed their component transactions before other individuals are conscious of any desire 
to undertake theirs.  Take the example of the tourist who, on leaving the art gallery, feels a 
transient desire to buy a souvenir.  He may have had no prior expectation of having this 
desire.  Even so, the gift shop stocks the goods that the tourist is now willing to pay for.  
Why?  Because the shop-owner anticipated the tourist’s demand.  She was trading with the 
wholesale suppliers of these goods before the tourist knew he was going to want them. 
  As this example illustrates, the realisation of surplus-creating opportunities can require 
entrepreneurship and arbitrage.  In the context of private goods, it is because the market 
facilitates and gives incentives for entrepreneurship and arbitrage that it is so effective at 
generating surplus.  But the surplus itself is defined from the viewpoint of each individual as 
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WTP at the moment of purchase.  Whether that WTP reflects a stable preference or a transient 
whim is of no significance for the measurement of surplus.  This privileging of the viewpoint 
of the consumer is intrinsic to the concept of consumer sovereignty.   
  Now consider how the concept of a surplus-creating opportunity can be extended to 
public goods.  Using the case of private goods as a template, the obvious way to proceed is to 
interpret a public good as a common source of benefits which accrue separately to each 
member of a group of individuals.  Because the good is public, there is non-rivalry among the 
beneficiaries – that is, whatever quantity is consumed by one of them must be consumed by 
all.  But this does not prevent us from thinking of the benefits as separable into benefits 
enjoyed by individuals.  For example, the transmissions of a public radio station have the 
property of non-rivalry, but each person who tunes in can be thought of as privately enjoying 
her own benefits of entertainment and information.  We now need to imagine a hypothetical 
payment mechanism by which, counterfactually, individuals can separately choose whether or 
not to buy specific benefits in return for specific payments.
8  For any specific mechanism of 
this kind, given the assumption of price sensitivity, it is principle possible to define the 
surplus that an individual enjoys by virtue of receiving a particular benefit free of charge: this 
surplus is the maximum amount that the individual would be willing to pay, within the 
mechanism, for the relevant benefit.  Thus, if the total cost of supplying the public good is 
known, we can say whether or not the policy of supplying it is a surplus-creating opportunity.  
Notice that there is no need to assume that preferences are coherent.  What is necessary is to 
define a specific (but hypothetical) payment mechanism.  I shall argue that the principle of 
market simulation points us towards particular kinds of hypothetical payment mechanism.  
  A market-simulating approach to CBA aims to identify and realise surplus-creating 
opportunities in situations in which the market cannot be relied on to do this.  As I have 
emphasised, in the situations in which the market can be relied on, the identification of 
surplus-creating opportunities requires entrepreneurship and arbitrage.  Surplus is defined 
from the viewpoint of each individual as consumer, but there has to be a mechanism for 
integrating these viewpoints.  If CBA is to be market-simulating, the analysis has to take the 
viewpoint of a special kind of arbitrageur – one who is seeking mutually-beneficial 
multilateral composite contracts, but without being able to appropriate surplus for herself.  
We might say that, in place of the ‘social planner’ of traditional welfare economics and 
libertarian paternalism, the market-simulation approach substitutes a ‘social arbitrageur’.  A 
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about what is good for those individuals, or about what they would want if they were more 
rational than they really are.
9 
  This concept of social arbitrage is already implicit in many of the practices of 
conventional CBA.  For example, consider the methods used in the CBA of transport projects.  
For concreteness, consider a policy proposal to introduce congestion pricing on urban roads.  
The standard CBA approach would typically use a computerised theoretical model to predict 
changes in traffic flows over future periods, with and without road pricing.  This model would 
include parameters to represent road-users’ subjective trade-offs between money outlays and 
travelling time; those parameters would have been estimated from past observations of 
individuals’ transport decisions.  The model’s predictions would then be interpreted as points 
on demand functions, and the effects of road pricing on road users would be measured as 
changes in consumers’ surplus.  Notice that this methodology uses the analyst’s predictions 
about the aggregated demands of future road users.  It does not ask potential road users now 
(that is, at the time the CBA is carried out) to report their monetary valuations, positive or 
negative, of the entire road-pricing option relative to the do-nothing alternative.  Why not? 
  One reason is that the analysis requires only aggregate predictions about demand, and 
behaviour is much more predictable in the aggregate than at the level of the individual.  To 
use individuals’ own predictions about their future travel plans would introduce unnecessary 
noise into the calculations.  Another reason is that individuals’ predictions of their own 
responses to unfamiliar stimuli (such as new systems of road pricing) may be less reliable 
than forecasts derived from well-specified models.  A third reason, and perhaps the strongest 
of all, is that individuals’ predictions about the effects of a policy on a complex system (such 
as a road network) are likely to be particularly unreliable.  It is because such effects are so 
difficult to predict that traffic engineers and transport economists use computer models rather 
than informed guesses.  Significantly, arguments such as these presuppose that CBA is an 
attempt to value the actual costs and benefits of policy options, not the costs and benefits that 
individual citizens currently expect will flow from those options.  The standard of valuation 
for benefits is the actual willingness-to-pay of the beneficiaries, at the moment of 
consumption.  In other words, this kind of CBA is social arbitrage. 
  This conclusion can be restated in terms of hypothetical payment mechanisms.  In 
defining the net surplus created by the road-pricing policy, the standard methodology assumes 
a hypothetical payment mechanism by which benefits are paid for at the moment of 
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valuations that individual citizens place on the policy as a whole, at the moment of the 
analysis.  Clearly, this could be investigated – for example, by a suitably designed contingent 
valuation survey.  To do so would be to define a different concept of surplus, based on a 
different hypothetical payment mechanism.  My claim is that the principle of market 
simulation favours hypothetical payment mechanisms which apply at the moment of 
consumption. 
 
5.  How the market-simulation approach copes with anomalies: an example 
I shall now suggest that some of the problems caused by anomalies may be less severe when 
surplus is measured at the moment of consumption, rather than in other ways.  The ideas 
underlying this suggestion are illustrated by the following example. 
  The example concerns the valuation of some environmental bad or ‘pollution’ (for 
example, air pollution, noise nuisance or visual intrusion), as it affects individuals in the role 
of occupiers of property.  For clarity, I use the following model.  There is a fixed set of 
houses, each with its own location in some urban area.  Houses are identical in all respects 
except their exposure to pollution.  The level of pollution varies across space; its level at any 
house can be measured on a one-dimensional scale, common to all houses.  Each house is 
rented by an individual occupier from a property-owning firm; there are many such firms.  
There is some random process which generates turnover in the population: current occupiers 
sometimes move away and are replaced by new arrivals.  Houses are rented in a competitive 
market, but occupiers who move from house to house incur non-zero transaction costs.  
Individuals are identical to one another and price-sensitive.  For the moment, the only other 
assumption I make about individuals’ preferences is that, other things being equal, lower 
levels of pollution are preferred to higher levels.  I do not assume preference coherence.  A 
policy intervention – say, the construction of a new road – is predicted to impact on pollution 
levels across the area.  The CBA problem is to assign a money value (positive or negative) to 
this effect. 
  One standard method of tackling this problem is by hedonic pricing.  The minimal 
assumptions I have made about preferences are sufficient to imply that, at any given time, the 
prices at which houses are rented are decreasing in pollution exposure.  If the market is 
sufficiently large and if there are no external shocks, we should expect the relationship 
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have the effect of a shock; but we should expect that, after some time, the market will settle 
down, again with a stable relationship between price and pollution.  (If the road has had a 
significant effect on overall pollution levels, the new relationship may be different from the 
old one.  If, for example, there is a significant reduction in the number of houses at low 
pollution levels, the premium for low-pollution property may increase.)  In principle, a well-
constructed forecasting model, calibrated on evidence from similar housing markets, would 
generate reliable estimates of the price/pollution relationships for the policy option and for the 
do-nothing alternative.  Such a forecasting model would typically be direction-neutral: the 
predicted price/pollution relationships for the two scenarios would not depend on which of 
them was given the ‘do-nothing’ label.  Using these relationships, the effect of the policy on 
property-owners can be measured by the net loss of rental income, while the effect on 
occupiers can be measured as a change in consumers’ surplus.  The sum of these effects is a 
measure of the net pollution effect of the road.  (If the price/pollution relationship remains 
constant, there is no change in consumers’ surplus, and so the net effect is simply the change 
in the rental value of property.)   
  An alternative method, also commonly used, is that of contingent valuation.  Suppose 
that, before the policy decision is made, we interview a random sample of occupiers.  We 
inform each individual about the predicted pollution effect of the road project on her property, 
and then ask her to state her valuation of this effect in, say, euros per week.  The sum of these 
valuations, scaled up by the ratio of population to sample (and adjusted to allow for any 
differences in response rates between occupiers of different types of property) is a measure of 
the net pollution effect of the road. 
  The question used to elicit valuations can be framed in different ways.  If the effect of 
the road on a particular respondent is an increase in pollution, the question might be framed in 
terms of WTA (‘What is the smallest reduction in rent which would compensate you for this 
additional pollution?’).  Or it might be framed in terms of WTP to reverse the policy proposal 
(‘Imagine that this additional pollution has already taken place.  What is the largest increase 
in rent that you would be willing to pay in order to reduce pollution to its current level?’)   
Notice that the difference between these two frames is one of direction.  The WTA question 
postulates the pollution level of the do-nothing alternative as the status quo, and asks the 
respondent to think about a change to the new-road option.  The WTP question postulates the 
pollution level of the new-road option as the status quo, and asks the respondent to think 
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respondent, the valuation question can be framed either in terms of WTP (‘What is the largest 
increase in rent that you would be willing to pay for this reduced pollution?’) or WTA 
(‘Imagine that this reduction in pollution has already taken place.  What is the smallest 
reduction in rent that would compensate you for a return to current levels of pollution?’). 
  If the pollution effects of the road are relatively small, the conventional theory of 
(reference-independent) preferences implies that any differences between the valuations 
elicited by WTA and WTP framings should be tiny.
10  However, there is overwhelming 
evidence that, in contingent valuation surveys and in corresponding experimental designs, 
respondents’ reported valuations are strongly influenced by reference points.
11  In practice, 
the WTA frame tends to elicit much higher reported valuations than the WTP frame.  Thus, 
the contingent valuation approach is not direction-neutral.  Viewed in relation to standard 
economic theory, this is an anomaly.  The best available theoretical explanation for this 
anomaly is that individuals’ preferences are reference-dependent – that is, an individual’s 
preferences between given consumption bundles differ according to the individual’s perceived 
reference point.
12 
  Comparing the hedonic pricing and contingent valuation methods, we have arrived at 
an apparently puzzling conclusion.  The hedonic pricing method yields a direction-neutral 
valuation of the pollution effects of the road, while the contingent valuation method does not.  
But the specification of the model seems to be the same in both cases.  Clearly, the (assumed) 
discrepancy between WTA and WTP valuations in the contingent valuation study implies that 
individuals’ preferences do not satisfy standard coherence conditions; but, in analysing the 
workings of the hedonic pricing method, I did not assume coherence.  Still, the hedonic 
pricing method has washed out the direction-specific effects which appeared in the contingent 
valuation method.  How can this be? 
  The (assumed) direction-neutrality of the hedonic pricing method stems from the 
assumption that the price/pollution relationship in the housing market depends only on 
current causal factors, such as the relative numbers of houses at different pollution levels, the 
characteristics of the population of potential occupiers, and so on; it is assumed to be 
unaffected by whether pollution levels in the recent past were higher or lower than they are 
now.  Is it credible to maintain this assumption while accepting the evidence of WTA/WTP 
disparities?  I think so, for the following reason.  Both methods aim to elicit individuals’ 
valuations of flows of benefits (positive or negative) which occur over time.  But the hedonic 
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experienced – while the contingent valuation method elicits them valuations at a single point 
in time, namely the moment at which the respondent answers the relevant survey question.  
Thus, the hedonic pricing method takes account of the effects of endogenous changes in 
reference points over time, while the contingent valuation method does not (unless the 
respondent herself anticipates them). 
  It is a striking feature of the experimental evidence that individuals’ reference points 
are easily displaced.  For a subject who comes into an experimental laboratory and is offered 
the opportunity to buy some good, say chocolates, the reference point is the pre-experiment 
state in which she had no chocolates.  But if the same subject is given the chocolates at the 
start of the experiment, and then a few minutes later is offered the opportunity to sell them, 
her reference point has already shifted to include the chocolates (Kahneman et al, 1990; 
Bateman et al, 1997).  The implication is that reference points adapt readily to changes in a 
person’s current circumstances.  When subjects are given repeated opportunities to buy and 
sell a good, disparities between WTA and WTP tend to be eroded (Loomes et al, 2003).  
Similarly, in cross-section comparisons of participants in sportscard markets, people with 
more market experience tend to show smaller WTA/WTP disparities (List, 2003).  It seems 
that the salience of one’s current holding of a good as a reference point dissipates as one gains 
experience of trade. 
  It would be a mistake to conclude that the reference-dependence of preferences never 
impinges on market transactions.  For example, an individual-level analysis of behaviour in 
housing markets has shown that, when a person moves from one US city to another, her 
housing decisions in the new city are influenced by prices in the old one.  (Someone who has 
just moved from a high-price city to a low-price city is likely to choose a better-quality house 
than an otherwise similar person who has lived for a long time in the low-price city.)  This 
effect disappears after the immigrant has become acclimatised to the prices of the new city 
(Simonsohn and Loewenstein, 2006).  For my purposes, however, the crucial point is that 
reference points adapt to current circumstances, and this is confirmed by Simonshohn and 
Loewenstein’s findings.  Thus, in a market equilibrium, we should expect that most 
individuals’ reference points approximately coincide with their actual consumption patterns. 
  It is for this reason that we should expect cross-section price/pollution relationships to 
be direction-neutral.  When we observe a housing market in equilibrium, each individual’s 
chosen price/pollution combination can be interpreted as a decision to stay at that 
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reference point.  Thus, the cross-section price/pollution relationship is not defined in relation 
to exogenously given reference points.  (If it were, shifts in reference points could make the 
relationship unstable.)  Rather, the relationship is defined in a way that makes reference points 
endogenous. 
  It must be admitted that this analysis raises the theoretical possibility of multiple 
equilibria.  If the agents in a market have reference-dependent preferences, and if reference-
dependence takes the usual form of aversion to movements away from reference points, the 
overall effect is to reduce the volume of trade (relative to what would occur if preferences 
were reference-independent).  It is conceivable that the market could be so thin as to make 
more than one price/pollution relationship compatible with equilibrium.  But notice that 
market prices are determined by the behaviour of active traders.  Provided there is a sufficient 
number of market participants whose preferences are not reference-dependent, the behaviour 
of these agents will fix the equilibrium.
13      
  If this analysis is correct, the hedonic pricing approach measures surplus in terms of 
long-run demand relationships – that is, demand relationships that are defined for endogenous 
reference points.  Thus, if reference points adjust reasonably quickly to changes in an 
individual’s circumstances, the hedonic pricing approach measures surplus at the moment of 
consumption.  In contrast, the contingent valuation approach measures surplus at the moment 
that the relevant survey questions are answered.  The hedonic pricing approach is more 
consistent with the principle of market simulation. 
  In this example, the hedonic pricing approach is less susceptible to anomalies caused 
by reference-dependence.  Notice, however, that I am not claiming that the hedonic pricing 
approach is superior because it is less susceptible to anomalies.  Nor am I claiming that the 
anomalies revealed by the contingent valuation approach are the result of error or irrationality, 
and not properties of  ‘real’ preferences.  My normative claim is that, in order to embody a 
commitment to consumer sovereignty, CBA should value benefits in terms of what the 
beneficiaries are willing to pay for them at the moment of consumption.  This principle  
favours particular kinds of hypothetical payment mechanisms as means of measuring surplus.  
In particular, it favours hedonic pricing over contingent valuation.  If, as I have suggested, 
these favoured mechanisms are less prone to anomalies, that is all to the good.  But in a 
certain sense, it is just good luck. 
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6.  Conclusion 
If the only conclusion to be drawn from the analysis in Section 5 was that hedonic pricing 
should be preferred to contingent valuation when both methods are feasible, that would not be 
particularly helpful.  In the policy-making community, there is already a general consensus 
that revealed preference methods are more reliable than stated preference ones, even if the 
precise interpretation of ‘reliable’ is unclear.
14  Stated preference methods are generally used 
only in situations in which revealed preference methods are impractical.  But I would prefer to 
interpret my analysis both more generally and more conjecturally, as suggesting a way of 
thinking about how to do CBA in the face of preference incoherence, and as identifying an 
agenda for further research. 
  The principle of market simulation tells us to look for measurements of surplus that 
are made as close as possible to the moment of consumption.  The first step towards 
implementing this proposal is simply to recognise the significance of the distinction between 
valuations that are revealed at the moment of consumption and valuations that are elicited ex 
ante.  This paper has largely been concerned with that step.  Having recognised this 
distinction, we can investigate the causal mechanisms which generate differences between the 
two kinds of measurement.  In the process, we may find that some anomalies are found in ex 
ante valuations but are absent from, or much less significant in, valuations that are revealed at 
the moment of consumption.  I have conjectured that this may be true of anomalies associated 
with reference-dependence.  By studying cases in which both kinds of valuation can be 
elicited, we may discover general methods for estimating moment-of-consumption valuations 
from data on ex ante valuations.  For example, investigations of the effects of market 
experience on WTA/WTP discrepancies show that, as experience accumulates, there is a 
tendency for WTP to increase and for WTA to fall, and that latter effect is stronger than the 
former (Loomes et al, 2003; List, 2005).  This suggests that moment-of-consumption 
valuations might be predicted by a weighted average of ex ante WTP and ex ante WTA, with 
WTP having the larger weight. 
  At the level of principle, I have tried to show that the principle of consumer 
sovereignty can be understood in a way that does not presuppose that preferences are 
coherent, and which can be implemented in CBA.  Someone who reads the evidence from 
behavioural economics as showing that individuals often lack coherent preferences can 
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paternalism. 
 
Notes 
1.  For surveys of ‘behavioural finance’ and ‘behavioural industrial organisation’, see 
Barberis and Thaler (2003) and Ellison (2007). 
2.  Sugden (1999) reviews the evidence of anomalies in relation to stated-preference studies. 
3.  A regulation is paternalistic if its intent is to induce individuals severally to act in ways 
that the regulating authority judges to be in those individuals’ best interests.  By ‘severally’, I 
mean that the regulation acts on each individual independently; regulations which are 
intended to deal with externalities or to enforce contributions to public goods are not 
paternalistic (Sunstein and Thaler, 2003b, pp 1161-1162). 
4.  This idea is explained in Kahneman and Sugden (2005); the idea itself is Kahneman’s. 
5.  I am referring to contractarianism of the kind espoused by Buchanan (1975).  Buchanan is 
strongly influenced by the much earlier work of Wicksell (1896/ 1958).  
6.  Green Book, Annex 2.  The Green Book can be accessed online at 
http://greenbook.treasury.gov.uk. 
7.  When pecuniary externalities are taken into account, it is not necessarily the case that no 
one loses as a result of a privately-profitable project; all one can show is that, hypothetically, 
the gainers could fully compensate the loses without becoming net losers themselves. 
8.  A classic example is the mechanism proposed by Erik Lindahl (1919/ 1958).  In this 
mechanism, each individual i is assigned a given share si of the costs of supplying a public 
good; these shares sum to 1 across all individuals.  Each i then chooses the quantity qi that he 
wants to be supplied, given this cost-sharing rule.  There is a Lindahl equilibrium if the cost 
shares si are such that all individuals choose the same quantity.  
9.  In the market, arbitrageurs are rewarded for correct anticipations of consumers’ demands, 
and penalised for incorrect ones.  It might be possible to design mechanisms of accountability 
for public decision-makers which, at least imperfectly, simulate this incentive property of 
markets.  But this issue is beyond the scope of the present paper.   
10.  For a formal analysis, and an explanation of what ‘tiny’ means, see Sugden (1999). 
  2911.  Horowitz and McConnell (2003) review a very large number of studies which have 
elicited comparable WTA and WTP valuations.  Using the theoretical analysis of Sugden 
(1999), they show that observed WTA/WTP ratios are much too large to be explained by 
income effects.   
12.  The first comprehensive theory of reference-dependent preferences over consumption 
bundles is due to Tversky and Kahneman (1991).  Later refinements of this theory include 
those of Munro and Sugden (2003) and Kőszegi and Rabin (2007).  An alternative approach, 
based on the assumption that individuals are uncertain about their own preferences, is 
proposed by Loomes et al (2007).  
13.  For a model of this kind, see Sugden (2003). 
14.  The Treasury Green Book (Annex 2: see note 6) gives the following recommendation: 
‘As a general rule, revealed preference methods are fairly reliable, and should be used where 
the relevant information can be inferred.  However, they cannot estimate the value placed on 
an asset by people who make no direct use of it.  In these circumstances, stated preference 
methods may be helpful.’  List (2005) reports that US policy-makers are more willing to trust 
valuations if they have been by revealed preference rather than stated preference methods. 
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